What is the relationship between bank fragility and competition during a period of market turmoil? Does market power in European banking involve extra-gains after discounting for the cost of government intervention? We answer these questions in the context of Eurozone banking over 2005-2012 and show that greater market power increases bank stability implying aggregate extra-gains of 57% of EU12 gross domestic product for the banking sector after discounting for the costs associated with government intervention. The negative influence of competition on bank stability is non-monotonic and reverses for lower degrees of competition. Capital injections, guarantees and asset relief measures elicit greater bank soundness.
Introduction
The response to the global financial crisis by governments and central banks was significant and unprecedented in both Europe and the US. Policy measures enacted ranged from initiatives dealing with impaired bank assets, the recapitalizing and/or financial restructuring of troubled banks, and various actions designed to inject liquidity into the banking system. 1
Between the start of 2008 and October 2014 European Union (EU) governments approved state aid to banking systems amounting to 45.8% of GDP comprising €1.49 trillion of capitalization and asset relief programs and €4.3 trillion of guarantees and liquidity measures.
Most state authorized aid was in the form of guarantees, some €3.9 trillion in total (most of which was granted at the peak of the crisis during 2008). 2 The scale of government aid provided to the financial sector has prompted concerns about anti-trust implications (White, 2009; Carletti and Vives, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; and CEPS, 2010) and also led some to investigate whether competitively disadvantaged banks should be subsidized (Lyons and Zhu, 2013) .
Given anti-trust concerns relating to the state support to banks, the main aim of this paper is to empirically analyse the effect of state-aid on competition as well as bank stability. To investigate the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and government intervention on competition and risk we analyse separate banking markets and control for a range of factors including systemic heterogeneity, bank-level fundamentals and macroeconomic features. We 1 See BIS (2009), Group of Thirty (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009) for detailed perspectives on the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis. For European insights see De Larosière (2009) and Goddard et al. (2009) . 2 Information from the EC State Aid to the banking sector scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html. compute various indicators (at the bank level) capturing overall stability, credit risk and liquidity risk. Competition is estimated using the Lerner Index (Calderon and Schaeck, 2015) which enables us to derive measures at the bank level and over time. Additionally, we include variables to capture different forms of government intervention, business models and the degree of market power. Using various panel techniques we test whether changes in competition are associated to variations in bank risk. We also investigate the impact of the crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) and the effect of government intervention on individual bank stability measured using the Z-index. In addition, we estimate the net pecuniary cost/gain of government intervention in the banking sector calculated on a countrywide basis as the difference between aggregate extra-profits associated with enhanced market power and the cost of government intervention computed as expenditures to gross domestic product (Maudos and de Guevara, 2007) . To address the usual endogeneity concerns of competition in our baseline regressions and in-line with previous studies (Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; Kick and Prieto, 2014) , we employ instrumental variable estimation methods.
We show that market power increases bank stability (consistent with previous literature, including Beck et al. (2013) and Fu et al. (2014) ) and this results in a net pecuniary gain (enhanced banking sector profits resulting from increases in market power that exceed the cost of government intervention). This finding is important for policy makers as it highlights the benefits as well as the costs of public support to the banking industry at times of crises.
We also show that the positive effect of market power on bank stability is non-monotonic and reverses for high levels of market power. Bank specialization is also found to be significantly and positively related to individual bank stability, namely, that capital injections, guarantees and asset relief measures increase individual bank soundness. 3 Our paper bridges two strands of the literature: the first investigates the link between competition and stability/fragility in banking; the second examines policy intervention postglobal financial crisis. The first strand of literature evaluates the link between competition and bank fragility with a well-established theoretical debate hinging on the trade-off between competition and stability (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005) . Allen and Gale (2004) underline the complexity of this relationship pointing out that though there are benefits from static efficiency, competition can lead to greater instability. Heightened competition, however, can reduce the "charter value" of banks causing instability in the financial system (Allen and Gale, 2004) . The empirical evidence on the link between competition and stability is somewhat mixed and largely dependent on the sample, estimation methodology and choice of conditioning variables used (Beck et al., 2013) . Schaeck et al. (2009) and Anginer et al. (2014) find that competition is positively related to systemic stability but Beck et al. (2006 ), Fu et al. (2014 and Diallo (2015) argue that more concentrated banking systems show a lower probability of systemic crises and greater resilience to such events compared with competitive systems. Berger et al. (2009) observe that, even if an increase in bank market power leads to riskier portfolios, the effect on stability could be offset by enhanced bank franchise values. Forssbaeck and Shehzad (2014) analyse 3 Although it would be interesting to investigate if various policy interventions produce a differential impact on market power in the long term, it is problematic to safely assess causality due to severe endogeneity issues. competition and stability in the deposit and loan market separately and show that in both markets competition is positively linked to greater default and asset risk. on bank stock returns. In contrast, bank failures and bail-outs generate strong negative returns, although this effect is mitigated for various G-SIBs 4 providing evidence of a "too-big-too fail" perception by investors. G-SIBs are not found to be equally responsive to all global policy interventions, but appear to be more sensitive to those announced in their own currency area.
While there is a growing literature on policy actions and bank/financial market behaviour post-financial crises, the impact of government intervention on banking sector competition and the potential net benefits of such actions have (as far as we are aware) yet to be addressed.
Specifically, there is no evidence of the effect of Government aid during the crisis on individual bank stability and whether potential benefits relating to greater market power offset the cost of government intervention.
Our study aims to make a significant contribution by focusing on the widespread state intervention in Europe while we account for heterogeneity in the intensity of interventions made by each Government and compare this against outcomes generated by the competitive banking environment of each country. Second, we advance previous research because we explicitly estimate the net pecuniary cost/gain of government interventions. Specifically, we propose an objective function where we compare the pecuniary gains from market power with the expense for stabilizing each country financial sector. A net pecuniary gain indicates that competition could be hastened as it would not increase the cost of government intervention. 5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the data and variables (section 2), and the empirical design (section 3). Next, we present our results (section 4) and robustness checks (section 5). Conclusions are summarized in section 6.
Data and variables
In this section, we outline our data collection process (section 2.1), the estimation process of the variables used to capture competition (section 2.2), bank risk-taking (section 2.3), government aid (section 2.4) and other economic phenomenon that may alter the relationships investigated (section 2.5).
Data
We analyse banks operating in the twelve countries that adopted the euro on the 1 st January 2002. Bank financial statements are taken from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database. The data span the years 2005 through 2012. 6 We select all types of depository institutions (commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks) and only use unconsolidated data.
After data cleansing, our final sample consists of around 19,100 observations for 2,621 individual banks distributed in the twelve countries. 7 In 2012, the median total assets of the 5 In the case of a net pecuniary cost government should contribute additional resources to cover for the overall lack of profitability of the domestic banking sector. 6 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were introduced across Europe in 2005, causing the dataset before and after 2005 to differ. 7 In terms of number, cooperative banks are the most represented (61%), followed by savings banks (25%) and commercial banks (14%) banks included in the sample are approximately Euro 680 million and only five banks have assets larger than Euro 100 billion. Looking at the distribution of banks over time per country, we notice that six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain) represent 98% of the sample. In 2012, the Netherlands is the country with the largest banks (with average assets size of Euro 63 billion) and Finland the lowest (Euro 650 million). The distributions of banks by year-specialization and by year-country are reported in Table 1 .
< INSERT HERE TABLE 1 >
Additional information on country-level data is retrieved from Eurostat, the World Bank, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. The justification for the choice of these variables is provided in section 2.5 describing other variables. All the variables constructed with accounting information are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile level of their distribution to mitigate the impact of outliers.
Measuring competition: the Lerner Index
We estimate a non-structural measure of competition using the Lerner Index (LER) to derive individual bank's monopoly power. This indicator represents the extent to which firms fix prices above marginal cost, it is computed as follows:
( 1 ) where the subscript i indicates each individual bank and t each individual year; P is the price of the output and MC is the marginal cost. Higher values of the index imply greater market power. , , , ,
The price of output P is calculated as total revenues (interest plus non-interest income) divided by total assets. For the estimation of marginal cost, we follow the intermediation approach where bank output is modelled as a stock identified by total assets, and inputs are deposits, labour and physical capital. Following some recent studies (Anginer et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2013) , we estimate a pooled OLS regression to derive marginal costs using a translog cost function with three inputs and one single output. We also include binary variables indicating bank's specialization to account for potential differences in business model (namely, commercial, savings and cooperative banks), the cost of borrowing and the nominal value of labour cost index for financial and insurance activities (to control for crosscountry heterogeneity) and time fixed effects to capture technical change (year dummy variables). The final specification is as follows:
( 2 ) where subscripts i, c and t indicate individual banks, countries and years, respectively; TC is total costs (the sum of personnel expenses, other administrative expenses and other operating expenses); Q is the banks' single output proxied by total assets; wj are the price of inputs employed in the production process: wL is the price of labour ( personnel expenses over total assets), wK is the price of physical capital (i.e., other operating expenses over total assets), wD is the price of deposits ( interest expenses over the sum of total deposits and money market funds). BankSpec and Year are the dichotomous variables for bank specialization and for each individual year respectively. Macro are macroeconomic variables 
at the country level;  are robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. A pooled OLS regression is used considering all 12 countries over 2005-2012. In addition, we impose the common restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in input prices. 8
From equation (2), marginal costs can be derived as follows:
( 3 ) 
To cross-check the reliability of the Lerner estimates, we estimate the Lerner Index for EU8 countries with at least 80 observations over the period 2005-2012, 9 and compute a separate estimation for EU8 countries over the period 2007-2012 to investigate the dynamics during the crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . We also compute an adjusted-Lerner index for credit risk exposure. Namely, we deduct loan impairment charges from total revenues to account for the exposure to credit risk. As further tests of robustness we estimate the efficiencyadjusted Lerner index employed in recent papers (Koetter et al., 2012; Buch et al., 2013) .
Finally, as in Beck et al. (2013) and Anginer et al. (2014), we employ an instrumental variable approach to deal with potential endogeneity issues associated with estimating the Lerner index.
Measuring bank risk exposures
We employ multiple measures of bank stability. Our main variable of interest is the overall bank risk of failure computed as the natural logarithm of the Z-Index (Buch et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2013; Forssbaeck and Shehzad, 2014) . The Z-Index is calculated at the bank level as follows:
where subscript i indicates individual banks, T the current period and t= {1...T}; ROA is the return on assets; E/A denotes the equity to total assets ratio; σ(ROA) is the standard 9 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. , , ,
deviation of return on assets for bank i using a rolling time window. 10 The Z-Index provides a measure of bank soundness because it indicates the number of standard deviations by which returns have to diminish in order to deplete the equity of a bank. A higher Z-Index implies a higher degree of solvency and therefore it gives a direct measure of bank financial stability.
We also use the natural logarithm of the Z-index to smooth out higher values of the distribution (Table 3) .
< INSERT HERE TABLE 3 >
We also include other risk measures employed in the literature. The liquidity risk measure is constructed as cash and due from banks on total short-term funding. It gives an indication on resources quickly available to cover cash outflows (Gropp et al., 2011) . The ratio of loan-loss provisions over total loans provides information on the exposure to credit risk (Jiménez et al., 2013; Kick and Prieto, 2014) . The coverage ratio indicates the level of solvency of a bank in terms of available capital compared to non-standard loans. It is constructed as the sum of equity and loan reserves minus non-performing loans, all divided by total assets.
Measuring government intervention
A number of variables are used to account for the crisis period and government intervention.
We first include in the analysis a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the years 2008 10 The method employed for the estimation of the standard deviation of return on assets may create autocorrelation. We therefore compute the autocorrelation of the Z-Index at different lags and find that the autocorrelation coefficients show a moderate level of autocorrelation (highest figure is 0.393 for the first lag). through 2012, 0 otherwise and following Laeven and Valencia (2013) 12 The combined effects are explored through the interaction between the government intervention and either this dummy variable or the Lerner index. Table 4 reports the information on the magnitude of the different forms of public intervention to support financial institutions as a percentage of GDP. 12 To be more specific, the marginal cost is estimated using Equations (2) and (3) for EU8 countries only over the period 2007-2012. (2007), we estimate a measure of the pecuniary cost/gain of market power in banking. Given that there could be a positive impact of market power for individual bank stability, we posit that the cost of government intervention may be offset by aggregate price mark-ups for various banks or across banking systems. We therefore calculate the following:
< INSERT HERE

Following Maudos and De Guevara
where subscript i, c and t indicate individual banks, countries and years, respectively;
GDP is the gross domestic product in a country in a year; n is the total number of individual banks in a country in a year; P is the price of output for each individual bank computed as total revenues over total assets; MC is the Marginal Cost for the individual bank computed as per expression (3); Q is the bank single output ( total assets); CostOfGov is the total expenditure in millions of euros born by a specific country in a year. Equation (5) 
Other variables
An additional set of variables are considered to investigate the potential effects of the influence of other determinants on the relationship between competition and risk, such as bank-level fundamentals, systemic heterogeneity and environmental determinants.
The bank level-fundamentals relate to financial leverage and size. We endogenise the decision on the level of financial leverage as the liability structure has a crucial effect on the relationship between insolvency risk and banking market power (Freixas and Ma, 2014) . The ratio is built as total liabilities to total equity. The size variable is computed as the natural logarithm of bank total assets.
As in Beck et al. (2013), a 'herding' measure is built as the within country standard deviation per year of non-interest income as a share of total assets. It takes into consideration the possible incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking following an increase in competition. The higher the value the more heterogeneous the sources of bank revenue (namely, less herding). In addition, we control for the influence of the macroeconomic environment using the GDP growth rate and the total long term unemployment rate (Jimenez et al, 2013; Forssbaeck and Shehzad, 2014) . The complete list of variables, data sources and definitions appear in Table 5.   < INSERT HERE TABLE 5 >   Table 6 reports the summary descriptive statistics of the sample and the correlation matrix for the relevant variables only. The Lerner index takes on negative values when marginal costs are higher than average prices, whilst the other variables are positively defined.
The Z-index shows a highly right-skewed distribution therefore supporting our decision to take the natural logarithm to smooth the data. It is also worth noting that there exists low correlation between all the pairs of variables.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 6 > 3 Identification strategy
Following a standard approach adopted in papers linking bank-fragility and competition (Gropp et al., 2011; Anginer et al., 2014; Forssbaeck et al., 2014) , we model bank risk taking as a function of bank-, industry-and country-level determinants as described below:
where the subscripts i, c, t denote individual bank, country and time dimensions respectively;
Risk is a bank risk-taking variable; COMP refers to banking competition; X are variables of interest to test our additional assumptions (namely the financial crisis period, bank's specialization and market power); GOV relates to various types of government intervention;
K are controls for bank-level fundamentals; and M are controls for macroeconomic conditions.
Our identification strategy involves three steps. First, we analyse the relationship among 
where Risk are different risk measures ( the natural logarithm of the Z-index; liquidity risk; credit risk; and the coverage ratio); COMP is the competition indicator measured using the Lerner index; Crisis is the dummy variable for the crisis period; K are controls for bank- 
where Risk is the natural logarithm of the Z-index; COMP is the Lerner index; BankSpec are two dichotomous variables for bank specialization; GovInt indicate the four forms of government intervention: capital injections, guarantees, asset relief and liquidity provision. 
Results
Using panel fixed effects and pooled OLS models we investigate the relationship between individual bank stability, competition and government intervention. First, we relate a set of risk measures to the Lerner index and a dummy variable for the crisis period. We then introduce government intervention and bank's specialization. We further explore whether banks with the highest market power have benefited more from the support of national governments and estimate the country net pecuniary gain/loss. Table 7 shows the results of our base regressions. Market power is positively associated with bank stability (Z-score and the coverage ratio) and negatively linked to liquidity and credit risk exposures. This finding is of particular interest to regulators and policy makers in the light of the unprecedented government intervention witnessed in Europe during the financial crisis. Competition is associated with higher liquidity risk: when the mark-up over marginal cost is higher, the opportunity-cost of liquid assets is also higher. In contrast with the theoretical predictions of Boyd and de Nicolò (2005) and in-line with earlier empirical work (Demsetz et al., 1996; Salas and Saurina, 2003) , we find that higher market power is associated with lower levels of provisioning and higher coverage ratios for non-performing loans. As expected, over the crisis period, banks experienced an increase in their overall risk of insolvency compared to the previous period (2005) (2006) (2007) as denoted by the negative value in the dummy variable for the crisis (Table 7 , Column 1). There is also a fall in the level of provisioning and the liquidity positions of banks.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 7 >
< INSERT HERE TABLE 8 >
In the second step, we turn to bank specialization and measures of the impact of government intervention (Table 8) . Between 2008 and 2012 cooperative and savings banks are relatively safer compared to commercial banks and asset relief has been effective in shoring up individual bank stability. The estimations provide other interesting results. First, we find negative statistical significance for liquidity measures (Column 5, Table 8 ). This suggests that liquidity injections do not improve overall solvency problems. Second, only savings banks appear to benefit from enhanced stability due to the extension of guarantees whereas evidence is inconclusive for cooperative banks and all banks in general. Asset relief measures overall have a positive effect on individual bank stability and for savings and cooperative banks the impact was higher, while for commercial banks asset relief appears to increase fragility.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 9 >
Results from the estimation including a dummy variable for banks with the highest market power show consistently greater risks (Table 9 ). Across all the estimations we find a negative sign for the coefficient of the high market power variable and strong statistical significance. Recapitalisation measures, guarantees and asset relief measures are all positively and generally significantly related to bank stability. Moreover, liquidity aid is negatively associated to overall bank solvency. Nonetheless, when we consider the combined effect with market power (Table 9 , Column 4 and 9), the effect is positive suggesting that government intervention through liquidity provision should be targeted at banks with greater market power.
To confirm the non-monotonic relationship existing between market power and individual bank stability, we use quantile regression to discern the conditional value of individual bank stability given bank market power. Results reported in Table 10 show that the conditional quantile treatment effects of market power on stability are statistically significant and positive up to the 6 th decile; it then turns statistically insignificant for the 7 th decile and switches sign for the highest Z-index deciles. 13 These findings, together with the results in Table 9 , have important policy implications because they implicitly recognize that market power is beneficial for bank stability up to a pointnamely up until the sixth decile (value of the Z-Index between 95 and 140) of the Z-index distribution.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 10 > 13 We turn to the distribution of the Z-index as we are interested in the threshold value that it would be difficult to discern using the logarithmic transformation. Nevertheless, we run the same analysis using the natural logarithm of the Z-Index and the results, available upon request from the authors, remain qualitatively the same.
We compute the net pecuniary cost/gains using Equation (5) al., 2013), the results may be driven by German data. We therefore estimate the Lerner index by excluding German banks and obtain the results for Equations (7-9) using this sub-sample.
We also consider alternative approaches to compute the Lerner and the Z-indexes. We follow the approach proposed by Koetter et al. (2012) and compute a Lerner index adjusted for efficiency scores. In addition, we also estimate an adjusted Lerner index to account for the credit risk exposure of each individual bank. As noted in Forssbaeck and Shehzad (2014) for lending rates, asset quality is not reflected in the calculation of the average price of the output therefore the risk premium is not considered in the computation of the market power.
We therefore estimate Equation (1) by subtracting from the numerator credit provisions.
Finally, we compute the Z-index following Yeyati and Micco (2007) where in Equation (4) average ROA 16 is substituted for current ROA.
The results of the robustness checks support our previous findings providing stronger evidence for the relationship among bank soundness, competition, market turmoil and government intervention.
Controlling for Endogeneity
We control for endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality. In the context of the research design used in this paper, we argue that it is not reasonable to assume a feedback effect going from risk-taking to competition. This is because competition estimates predate banks' risk-taking for years: it is rational to expect that banks' can control and fix their own asset allocation decisions (so their risk exposure) based on various factors, including the degree of competition in the industry experienced in the past.
Endogeneity arising from omitted variables, however, could be a problem. We argue that this may potentiality exist, despite including a number of control variables in our main regressions and, especially, firm-fixed effects (Equation 7). As such, we employ an instrumental variable approach using the GMM estimator to address potential endogeneity problems. Following Anginer et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2013) , we use three different instruments. First, we instrument competition by using the two-year lagged Lerner Index.
Second, we use one year lagged credit growth because the lagged year-on-year growth in net loans is likely to be correlated to competitive conditions but not to current risk-taking decisions. Third we employ the cost-income ratio in a typical setting where bank concentration, hence competition, is endogenously driven by bank efficiency (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977) but does not obviously relate to risk decisions.
< INSERT HERE TABLE 12 >
We report in Table 12 the results from the first and the second stage regressions when all the instruments are concurrently used in the first-stage regression. 17 Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) report the results from the first-stage estimations, whilst columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) the estimations from the second stage regression. Overall, the results lend support to our major findings regarding the effects of competition and government aid on bank fragility.
Conclusions
Understanding the competition-stability nexus is important in terms of gauging the resilience of banking sectors. This is particularly true at times of crisis when tax-payers money is used to rescue and stabilise distressed credit institutions.
We investigate the extent of the relationship between market power and stability in Liquidity measures appear to decrease bank stability but this effect is reversed when liquidity aid is combined with market power.
We compute an adjusted gain/loss function where we explicitly compare the cost of bailouts against the systemic gains associated with increased price-marginal cost makups (higher market power). We advocate that a cost-benefit approach to gauge the impact of state intervention in the banking sector should take into account the extra-profits associated with increased market power as well as the cost of government intervention. High market power may be justified if it is associated with extra-capital buffers to absorb systemic shocks. The gains from increased market power may lower or compensate for the expenditures of government intervention. The policy target should be close or around zero to allow for a safety buffer in case of systemic banking crises. We find that this is not the case for all EU12 countries where the mark-up is positive over the crisis period (except for Greece and Ireland).
Our results have various limitations that are meaningful starting points for future research. First, different factors should be considered to find the right balance between allowing a moderate mark-up in the banking sector and the likelihood that bailouts should be of increased magnitude. Second, further work should consider the broader costs associated with banking crises as the immediate bailout expenses are likely to understates total societal costs (Boyd et al., 2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2013) . Third, reductions in outputs associated with enhanced market power are not considered in our analysis and this could influence the pecuniary gains/losses associated with the crises. All the aforementioned areas are worthy of future investigation. Herding measure HERD This is a measure of banking industry heterogeneity computed as the within country standard deviation of the percentage non-interest income (with respect to total assets) per year (t) and per country (c).
Macroeconomic indicators MACRO CONTROLS
Set of macroeconomic indicators: annual percentage change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP_gro); long-term unemployment (12 months and more) in millions of people looking for a paid job (Lt_unemp). Table 7 Link between bank stability, competition and the crisis period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) in
Eurozone banks
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (7). We use a panel fixed effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. The sample includes European banks in EU12 over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Notice that the total number of observations (17,874) reflects the unbalanced nature of the data set (Ti ≠ T for some banks). We report the p-value of the Hausman test (row Hausman test -p-value), in which the null hypothesis is that the random effects estimator is both efficient and consistent. Rho is the intraclass correlation; the higher the better is the fitting of the model. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES lnZ CovRatio LLPTL LIQ LERt-1 0.800*** 0.020* -0.006*** -0.027*** (0.105) (0.011) (0.002) (0.010) CRISISt-1 -0.443*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.009*** (0.020) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) ln_TOTAt-1 -0.405*** -0.025*** 0.001 -0.000 (0.050) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) FLt-1 -0.006* -0.002*** 0.000* 0.000 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) HERDt-1 -0.002 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) GDP_grot-1 -0.018*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Unemp_allt-1 -0.023*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** (0.006) (0 Table 9 Link
between bank stability, competition and government intervention in Eurozone banks
This table reports the results from the estimation of Equation (9). We use a pooled ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. Equation (9) is estimated for EU8 over the period 2007-2012. We control for country and time fixed effects. Bank controls include size and financial leverage. The sample comprises European banks in EU8 over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Notice that the total number of observation (11, 786) reflects the unbalanced nature of the data set (Ti ≠ T for some banks). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% two tailed level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
(1) Table 12 Instrumental variable regressions This table presents the results of the instrumental variable regression. For the sake of space, we report the results for the estimations of a limited number of specifications, specifically Column (1) in Table 7 , Column (5) in Table 8 and Columns (6) to (9) in Table 9 . Following Anginer et al. (2014) and Beck et al. (2013) , we employ as instruments for the Lerner Index the two-year lagged Lerner index, one-year lagged loan growth and one-year lagged cost-income ratio. Results from the first-stage regression appear in Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11). The row Lert-1 reports the coefficients for the fitted values of the Lerner Index obtained from the first-stage regression. Results from the second-stage regression appear in Columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12). Estimates are obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with robust standard errors clustered at the individual bank level. In Columns (6), (8), (10) and (12) the instrumented variables are the Lerner Index and the interactions between the Lerner Index and capital injections, guarantees, asset relief and liquidity provision, respectively. Columns (5), (7), (9) and (11) presents the first-stage results for the Lerner Index only. For the sake of space, we do not present the results of first-stage regressions for the interactions. The row Adjusted R-squared presents the result of the goodness-offit of the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression. The higher the better are the instruments in explaining the Lerner Index. The row C (difference-in-Sargan) presents the results of the test of endogeneity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis the instruments are exogenous. Robust F presents the results of the F statistic. The higher the value the better the goodness-of-fit. Hansen's J presents the results for Hansen's J statistic. Under the null hypothesis, the over-identifying restrictions are valid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
